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YERSHOV V. GANNETT: RETHINKING THE VPPA IN THE 21ST
CENTURY
Ariel Pardee*
I. INTRODUCTION
Information privacy in the twenty-first century is a slippery concept. It exists in
the shadows of technology, peeking out in companies’ privacy policies, or being
dragged out by the media after a data breach or a new technology oversteps
consumers’ personal privacy boundaries. 1 The collection of personal information
from mobile devices by mobile applications has also generated significant concerns
for some users. What information are these companies collecting? What are they
doing with it? With whom are they sharing it? Much of the controversy stems from
the practice of interest-based advertising.
While interest-based advertising is not a new phenomenon, modern technology
coupled with advanced data collection techniques and data analysis methods have
shaped the practice into an exponentially more sophisticated—and ubiquitous—
industry than it was before.2 From the standpoint of some mobile users the practice
feels tantamount to being constantly surveilled,3 while other users seem to
understand that part of conducting one’s affairs online means, in many cases, one’s
informational data is going somewhere.4 For better or worse, only limited guidance
for the practice has been provided by federal legislation or regulation. 5 In particular,
the agency charged with “protecting America’s consumers,” the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”), has promulgated almost no regulations that restrict or control
the collection and disclosure of mobile device data by private companies. 6 As a

* J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2018. The Author thanks Professor
Peter Guffin for his time and guidance in helping her navigate the nuances of Information Privacy Law.
1. See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says Hackers Stole Data on 500 Million Users in 2014, N.Y.
TIMES, (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/technology/yahoo-hackers.html?action=
click&contentCollection=Technology&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article;
Herb Wisebaum, ‘Hell No Barbie’: Social Media Campaign Targets Talking Doll, NBC NEWS, (Nov. 9,
2015, 1:20 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/hell-no-barbie-social-media-campaigntargets-talking-doll-n459936.
2. See CRAIG DEMPSTER & JOHN LEE, THE RISE OF THE PLATFORM MARKETER: PERFORMANCE
MARKETING WITH GOOGLE, FACEBOOK AND TWITTER, PLUS THE LATEST HIGH-GROWTH DIGITAL
ADVERTISING PLATFORMS 2-3 (2015); see also Shea Bennett, The Evolution of Marketing Data—From
Direct Mail to Twitter (1960-2012), ADWEEK: SOCIALTIMES, (July 3, 2013, 3:00PM), http://www.
adweek.com/socialtimes/marketing-data-history/487271.
3. See Natasha Singer, Sharing Data but Not Happily, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/06/05/technology/consumers-conflicted-over-data-mining-policies-report-finds.html.
4. Id.
5. Despite the introduction of multiple over-arching data protection laws, Congress has only
managed to enact one, the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, which specifically regulates the
collection of data by online companies designed to serve children. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2012).
6. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). The FTC
specifically regulates the collection and disclosure of data in the Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2013). Excluding COPPA, the FTC does not regulate the general collection and
disclosure of data by ad tech companies, but instead relies on existing regulations prohibiting unfair trade
and deceptive practices, such as when a company violates its own stated privacy policy. See Jennifer
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result, some disconcerted mobile device users have asked courts to interrupt the
practice using the only means available to them: arguably outdated privacy laws
written long before the information age went mobile.
Yershov v. Gannett is just such a case.7 Plaintiff Alexander Yershov asked the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, and later the First
Circuit Court of Appeals, to find defendant Gannett Satellite Information Systems,
Inc. (“Gannett”), the owner of the USA Today Mobile App, in violation of a law
written long before mobile applications—or mobile internet technology in general—
became mainstream.8 The 1988 law, called the Video Privacy Protection Act
(“VPPA” or “the Act”), was originally enacted to prohibit individuals’ video cassette
rental histories from being disclosed to third parties.9 In deciding Gannett’s motion
to dismiss the claim, both the district court and the First Circuit were tasked with
deciding whether to interpret two definitions within the Act so broadly that: (1)
certain data collected from a mobile application on a smartphone would fall within
the statutory definition of “personally identifiable information”; and (2) whether the
use of a free downloaded mobile application would make a user a “consumer,” within
the meaning of the statute.10 The district court found that while the data was
personally identifiable information, Yershov was not a consumer under the VPPA
definition, and subsequently granted Gannett’s motion to dismiss. 11 On appeal by
Yershov, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal, holding that not only
was the data personally identifiable information, but that Yershov was in fact a
consumer within the definition provided by the VPPA. 12
This Comment will challenge the courts’ characterization of the mobile device’s
GPS location and the associated unique device identifying number collected and
disclosed by Gannett as personally identifiable information (“PII”) under the VPPA,
as neither piece of information fits within the bounds of the definition as identifying
a “particular person.”13 Furthermore, this Comment will argue that the First Circuit
interpreted the statutory definition of “consumer” too broadly when it held that the
simple act of downloading a free mobile application is synonymous with becoming
a “subscriber,” a subset of the VPPA’s definition of “consumer.” Rather than reading
Woods, Federal Trade Commission’s Privacy and Data Security Enforcement Under Section 5,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young
_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/federal_trade_commissions_privacy.html
(last
visited Jan. 24, 2017). However, the FTC recently published a consumer privacy report that outlines best
practices for businesses and policymakers. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN
AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protectingconsumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations /120326privacyreport.pdf.
7. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 135 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2015)
rev’d, 820 F.3d 482 (1st Cir. 2016).
8. Many see the introduction of the iPhone in 2007 as the moment when smartphones—and the
mobile internet—moved beyond rudimentary web browsers and email checking. See, e.g., Fred
Vogelstein, The Day Google Had to ‘Start Over’ on Android, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com
/technology/archive/2013/12/the-day-google-had-to-start-over-on-android/282479/.
9. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (2012).
10. Yershov, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 141, 148; Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d
482, 484 (1st Cir. 2016).
11. Yershov, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 146, 149.
12. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 486, 489-90.
13. S. Rep. No. 100–599, at 12 (1988).
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the word “subscriber” as it is plainly and ordinarily understood, the First Circuit
interpreted the term “subscriber” as virtually synonymous with the term “user” or
“viewer,”14 and in doing so has expanded the application of the statute far beyond
the intention of the legislation’s authors. A statute such as this one is best read
narrowly, so as to avoid requiring the courts to read contemporary legislative intent
into antiquated legislation. As Justice Samuel Alito has suggested, “[i]n
circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy
concerns may be legislative. A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing
public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a
comprehensive way.”15
This Comment will also attempt to shed a bit of light on the mobile advertising
technology (“ad tech”) ecosystem from which Yershov and similar cases have arisen.
It will explore the curious reliance that mobile technology has on data collection by
the mobile ad tech industry, and the direction of information privacy regulation in
the mobile ad tech universe by both the companies themselves, and government
regulators.
To these ends, Part II sets the stage of the modern ecosystem of mobile internet
advertising technology; Part III takes the reader back to examine the VPPA’s origins
and purpose; Part IV provides the procedural background of Yershov v. Gannett; Part
V analyzes the courts’ decisions and reasoning in Yershov, and the implications
thereof; and Part VI examines the possible future of information privacy law relating
to mobile internet technology and the collection of data from mobile devices.
II. MOBILE TECHNOLOGY AND THE AD TECH ECOSYSTEM
A. “If You’re Not Paying for It, You’re the Product”16
No one could have predicted the radical evolution of targeted marketing during
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The advent of internet technology, and later
the mobile internet, transformed targeted marketing—now called interest-based
advertising—into a complex and sophisticated ecosystem that runs largely on the
synergistic interactions of four big players: website and app publishers; users and
consumers of mobile internet technology; advertisers; and third party advertising
companies.17 Simply put, mobile app and website publishers create, maintain, and
improve the mobile internet, and have a reasonable expectation to get paid for these
contributions. Mobile users want a high quality and innovative mobile internet
experience, but expect most websites and apps to be accessible at marginal or zero

14. That Congress chose to use the word “subscriber” and not “user” or “viewer” was noted by the
Eleventh Circuit in its interpretation of the VPPA. Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 125657 (2015).
15. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012).
16. The saying—and the underlying idea—are not easily attributed to any one person, but can be
found throughout the marketing sector’s history as early as the 1980’s. See Jonathan Zittran, Meme Patrol:
“When Something Online is Free, You’re Not the Customer, You’re the Product.” HARVARD UNIVERSITY:
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT (Mar. 21, 2012), http://blogs.harvard.edu/futureofthe
internet/2012/03/21/meme-patrol-when-something-online-is-free-youre-not-the-customer-youre-theproduct/.
17. See How Does It Work, NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, http://www.networkadvertising.org/
understanding-online-advertising/how-does-it-work (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
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cost. So how can publishers expect to be compensated for their work if consumers
are unwilling to pay for it? Taking a page from the playbook of traditional media
operations, webpage and in-app advertising has provided a significant source of
revenue for publishers.18 Advertisers are willing and eager to pay for the opportunity
to advertise to publishers’ users; and the more likely a particular user is to be
interested in purchasing the advertised product or service, the more valuable that
advertising opportunity is to the advertiser. 19 Third party advertising companies
enter the system to connect the dots—they collect, organize, and analyze interestbased and demographic information about users collected from various sources, so
as to better predict who those interested users are, thus increasing the value of
advertising opportunities online—hence, interest-based advertising’s integral role in
the internet as we know it.20
B. A Primer on Mobile Application Advertising
As alluded to above, most advertisements one sees in a mobile application are
not virtual billboards seen by all who happen to use a particular app. Rather, the
point of modern advertising technology is to get “the right message, to the right
person, in the right place, at the right time.” 21 By collecting and analyzing
demographic information and information about users’ interests, companies are able
to target marketing efforts to the users most likely to be interested in—and then
purchase—the product or service.22 From the perspective of a user, her online
experience is—dare I say—enhanced by being shown ads that are relevant to her
interests. Some in the ad tech industry would go even further and say advertising
companies are actually providing a service to users by educating them about new
products they are likely to find useful. 23
The techniques developed by third party advertisers to collect user information
from internet sources have evolved alongside internet technology. Methods that
have worked in a desktop internet browser are not as effective on a mobile internet
browser.24 Moreover, a significant portion of time spent on a mobile device is not in
18. Spending on digital advertising in 2015 reached $59.6 billion, and over half of that was spent on
mobile advertising. See Kristine Lu & Jesse Holcomb, Digital News Revenue: Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (June 15, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/06/15/digital-news-revenue-fact-sheet/.
19. DEMPSTER & LEE, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 13-14.
20. See NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, supra note 17.
21. DEMPSTER & LEE, supra note 2, at 116; see also Mike Sands, How the Cookie Crumbles in a
Mobile-First World, MARTECH TODAY, (Dec. 15, 2015), https://martechtoday.com/cookies-crumblemobile-first-world-154114.
22. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 2 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federaltrade-commission-staff-report-self-regulatory-principles-online-behavioral-advertising/p085400/
behavadreport.pdf; see also Carol Hildebrand, 3 Signs That Mobile Data is the New Marketing Overlord,
FORBES: ORACLEVOICE, (Nov. 16, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/oracle/ 2015/11/16/3signs-that-mobile-data-is-the-new-marketing-overlord/#49e4a34e46f6.
23. See generally Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, The Hidden Benefactor: How Advertising Informs,
Educates, & Benefits Consumers, PROGRESS SNAPSHOTS, Feb. 2010, at 1-2.
24. Sands, supra note 21. While ad tech companies can and do employ the use of third-party
“cookies,” (text files placed in a desktop browser for the purpose of data collection by companies other
than the website’s publisher) most mobile browsers have blocked third-party cookies from being used.
Additionally, cookies simply do not work in mobile apps. Additionally, as users have begun to use more
than one device—smartphones, laptops, tablets, smart TVs, etc.—the ad tech sector has developed
technology to track users’ online behavior across multiple devices, called cross-device targeting. This
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a browser at all, but rather in various mobile applications. 25 Apps are programmed
to collect data, often by permission, directly from users’ devices.26 Upon
downloading and opening the app, a user may be asked to sign into an existing user
profile, or to create a new profile with a user name or email address. Once registered
and signed in, the publisher of the app can track the user’s viewing habits and
purchasing history within that publisher’s internet presence, and across multiple
devices.27 This type of data collection—the collection of data by a mobile
application with which the user has a direct relationship—is known in the ad-tech
sector as “first party data.”28 An app publisher may also provide that same data to a
third party advertising company, making the data “third party data,”29 a concept that
will be discussed further below.
But not all first party or third party data is organized using identifiable
information like names or email addresses. Instead, many app publishers and third
party advertising companies organize collected information by linking it to a
pseudonymous number associated with a particular device.30 Prior to 2012, this
number—a unique alpha-numeric sequence called a “mobile device identifier”—was
a number permanently associated with the specific device’s hardware.31 The user of
the device had little or no ability to prevent apps from using the mobile device
identifier for advertising purposes and therefore had little control over what
information was being associated with it.32 In 2012, after Congress voiced concerns
about mobile device identifiers and consumer privacy, 33 the industry abandoned
them for another pseudonymous identifier referred to as a “mobile advertising
identifier.”34 A mobile advertising identifier operates in a way similar to its
technology is not without its critics. See The Editorial Board, Monitoring Your Every Move, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/10/opinion/monitoring-your-every-move.html
(explaining cross-device targeting and asserting a need for more federal regulation).
25. How Mobile Apps Stack Up Against Mobile Browsers, EMARKETER, (Jan. 14, 2016),
https://www.emarketer.com/Article/How-Mobile-Apps-Stack-Up-Against-Mobile-Browsers/1013462.
26. Kenneth Olmstead, Mobile Apps Collect Information About Users, With Wide Range of
Permissions, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/29
/mobile-apps-collect-information-about-users-with-wide-range-of-permissions/.
27. See id.
28. See Getting to Know You, THE ECONOMIST, (Sept. 13, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/
special-report/21615871-everything-people-do-online-avidly-followed-advertisers-and-third-party.
29. See id.
30. Many companies see the benefit of maintaining users’ trust and privacy, and have joined selfregulatory agencies committed to developing best practices of the ad tech industry. See About the NAI,
NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, http://www.networkadvertising.org/about-nai/about-nai, (last visited
Jan. 29, 2017); see also How Does It Work, NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, http://www.network
advertising.org/understanding-online-advertising/how-does-it-work (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
31. Apple called the number the “unique device identifier” (“UDID”), while Google called it the
“Android ID.” See Scott Thurm & Yukari Iwatani Kane, Your Apps Are Watching You: A Journal
Investigation Finds That iPhone and Android Apps Are Breaching the Privacy of Smartphone Users,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870469400457602008370
3574602.
32. See id. (“The great thing about mobile is you can’t clear a UDID like you can a cookie.”).
33. See Connie Guglielmo, Congress Queries Apple, iPhone Developers About Privacy, FORBES,
(Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/connieguglielmo/2012/03/22/congress-queries-appleiphone-app-developers-about-privacy/#348781ca3885.
34. Apple calls this number the Identifier for Advertisers (“IDFA”), where Android calls the number
the Google Advertising ID (“GAID”). See Understanding Online Advertising: Glossary, NETWORK
ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, http://www.networkadvertising.org/understanding-online-advertising/glossary
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predecessor, in that apps and advertising companies may use it as a common tag for
data that mobile apps collect about a user. However, unlike the mobile device
identifier, the mobile advertising identifier is designed to be reset or turned off
entirely at any time by the user simply by the press of a button in the device’s settings,
thus returning some control of data collection by apps to the user and generally
reducing some users’ privacy concerns. 35
As indicated previously, mobile application and website publishers may employ
third party advertising companies to analyze the data that they collect. These
companies, which sometimes operate as data analysis firms or “data brokers,” gather
information from sources on the web, mobile apps, and sometimes from offline
sources in order to compile comprehensive dossiers of users’ information. 36 Some
firms claim to have up to 100 data points on mobile users. 37 While it is likely that
identifiable information like names, home addresses, or email addresses are
incorporated into these dossiers, companies in the business of online advertising are
less interested in that type of information, and more interested in demographic and
interest data.38 After all, the principal purpose of this type of data collection and
analyzation is to meet the advertiser’s ultimate goal: to show their online ads to those
users who are most likely to purchase whatever they are selling. Names and
addresses have a limited ability to help make this determination. On the other hand,
demographic information (e.g. age and gender), interest data (e.g. topics of articles
read within media apps), and even geo-location information can give a much better
idea to the advertising company about whether an advertisement will be successful
with a viewer, without directly revealing his or her identity. 39 With this type of
information, an advertising company can then advertise to all viewers who match a
particular category or demographic, for instance all users who are of a particular age
range, who live in a particular area, and who are bicycle enthusiasts. The more
demographic and interest information an advertising company can collect—even
without names or home addresses—the better they can predict which ads are relevant
to which users.
C. The Spectrum of Personally Identifiable Information
Rather than being easily demarcated between identifiable and non-identifiable,
personal information, like that mentioned above, is better described as falling along

(last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
35. Laura Stampler, Here’s Everything We Know About IFA, the iPhone Tracking Technology in
Apple’s iOS6, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Oct. 15, 2012, 3:59 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/everythingwe-know-about-ifa-and-tracking-in-apples-ios-6-2012-10.
36. For a helpful infographic illustrating the collection of information by data brokers, see FED.
TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (2014).
37. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 28.
38. See Ilana, What Advertisers Know About You: Online Privacy and Personally Identifiable
Information, RETARGETER, http://blog.retargeter.com/general/what-advertisers-know-about-you-onlineprivacy-and-personally-identifiable-information (last visited Jan. 30, 2017); see also Frequently Asked
Questions, NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, https://www.networkadvertising.org/faq, (last visited
Jan. 30, 2017) (“As a general rule, [interest-based advertising] . . . does not depend on information that
personally identifies you . . . .”).
39. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 28.
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a spectrum.40 At one end of the spectrum is the clearest category of PII: a person’s
actual name.41 Further down the spectrum, but still widely considered PII, is data
that is easily traced to a particular person using information in the public domain like
home addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses.42 Highly sensitive data like
social security numbers and financial account numbers are also widely accepted as
PII, not because they can be easily traced to a particular person, but because of the
harm that can come from an unauthorized person gaining access to that type of
information.
Toward the other end of the spectrum is pseudonymous identifiers like user
names, unique device identifiers, mobile advertising identifiers, IP addresses, and
browser fingerprints. This is data that is not generally considered highly sensitive,
and cannot be easily re-identified by an ordinary person.43 It is also at this end of the
spectrum, perhaps at the farthest end, where anonymous information like interest and
demographics belong; things like age or hobbies (“18-24” and “video games”). As
suggested above, and perhaps surprisingly, many ad tech companies prefer the
pseudonymous and anonymous information at this end of the spectrum. By using a
mobile advertising identifier tag instead of a name, companies in the ad tech industry
can capture and organize much of the demographic and interest data they need to
market their products successfully, while maintaining the trust and confidence of
their users.44
Two other pieces of data sometimes collected by mobile apps are at issue in
Yershov: a user’s geo-location, and the titles of videos a user has watched. First,
mobile applications may collect a user’s location data using IP addresses, global
positioning systems (“GPS”), Wi-Fi triangulation, or beacons. 45 For advertisers,
location data can provide a cache of inferential information: demographic
information like income and education can be inferred by comparing a user’s primary
location data to public census data; information about a user’s interests can be
inferred by noting visits to museums, theme parks, or the wilderness. 46 Location
information can even indicate more narrow preferences like where a user prefers to
40. In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d 262, 282-83 (3d Cir. 2015); see also Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J.
Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U
L. REV. 1814, 1877 (2011) (discussing a spectrum of “information [that] can be about an (1) identified,
(2) identifiable, or (3) non-identifiable person.”).
41. In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d at 282-83.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 290.
44. Timothy Morey, Theodore Forbath & Allison Schoop, Customer Data: Designing for
Transparency and Trust, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, (May 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/05/customerdata-designing-for-transparency-and-trust (last visited April 14, 2017).
45. MOBILE MKTG. ASS’N, Demystifying Data Location Accuracy: The New Frontier and Biggest
Mobile Opportunity, http://www.mmaglobal.com/files/documents/location-data-accuracy-v3.pdf (last
visited April 14, 2017).
46. See id. at 4. But see John Koetsier, 80-90% Of Mobile Ad Location Data Is Wrong, Says Top Ad
Exec, FORBES, (Dec. 2, 2016, 2:14 PM) (suggesting that a substantial amount of the geo-location data
used by advertisers is wrong), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2016/12/02/80-90-of-mobile-adlocation-data-is-wrong-says-top-ad-exec/2/#4f9cb69b666e.
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shop or which restaurants a user frequents. 47
Second, some advertisers are gathering data based on users’ mobile video
consumption. Americans in 2016 are spending an average of over three hours a day
consuming media on mobile devices, and more than thirty minutes of that time is
spent watching video content. This represents a 300 percent increase since 2012. 48
The average length of videos viewed on a mobile device are of shorter duration than
those watched on a television or computer; full length television shows and movies
are watched far less than videos with a duration of five minutes or less.49 This means
the average person is likely to watch multiple short videos a day, probably consisting
of some combination of comedic video clips (i.e. “viral videos”), music videos,
movie trailers, sports clips, how-to videos, and news clips.50 As one might imagine,
the aggregate of these videos watched over a period of time can reveal quite a bit of
information about a user’s interests; information that is valuable to companies
looking to market their products to a targeted audience.
So how does the modern ad-tech industry’s collection of this type of
pseudonymous and anonymous data fit into a 1988 statute written to restrict the
disclosure of rental records of “prerecorded video cassette tapes” 51 by video rental
stores? Not easily.
III. THE VIDEO PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT OF 1988
A. Origins
The collection of personal information by both governmental and private
organizations became routine with the arrival of modern record-keeping technology
after the Second World War.52 Following the advent of computers in the 1960s and
further advances in data processing in the 1970s and 80s, Congress became
concerned with the breadth and depth of this information. 53 They enacted a series of
federal statutes regulating the disclosure of particular kinds of personal information
collected and held by particular entities. These included credit records,54 student
education records,55 federally stored personal information, 56 tax returns,57 bank

47. See MOBILE MKTG. ASS’N, supra note 45, at 4; see also THE ECONOMIST, supra note 28.
48. Media Buying, Growth in Time Spent with Media Is Slowing, EMARKETER, (June 6, 2016),
https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Growth-Time-Spent-with-Media-Slowing/1014042.
49. Mobile Video 2015: A Global Perspective (2015), ONDEVICE RESEARCH, http://www.iab.com/
wp-content/uploads/2015/06/IAB_Mobile_Video_Usage_FINAL.pdf (last visited April 14, 2017).
50. Id.
51. 18 U.S.C.A § 2710(a)(4) (2012).
52. See generally Schwartz & Solove, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1820; see also
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, U.S.
DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE 7 (1973).
53. Schwartz & Solove, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1820.
54. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) (prohibits any person from procuring
a credit report of another person without permission).
55. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2012).
56. Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012) (prohibiting the disclosure of any records kept by
governmental agencies).
57. Tax Reform Act of 1976, 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012) (prohibiting the disclosure of tax return or
return information).
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records,58 and individuals’ cable television viewing habits.59 The VPPA came
toward the end of that trend, and arose not out of a natural progression of privacy
law, but as a hasty reaction to what members of Congress saw as an intolerable
breach of privacy.
It began with President Ronald Reagan’s 1987 nomination of Judge Robert Bork
to fill a vacancy on the United States Supreme Court.60 While the Senate Judiciary
Committee vetted Bork in confirmation hearings, an industrious Washington City
Paper reporter obtained Bork’s video rental history from the local video rental
store.61 The list of videos, which was published in the newspaper for public scrutiny,
was hardly damning; it showed only Bork’s penchant for Alfred Hitchcock and Cary
Grant movies.62 But the idea that a citizen’s—or a legislator’s—video rental history
could be publicly released and published as news resonated with outrage in
Congress.63 They worked quickly to introduce and enact a law prohibiting just that
sort of disclosure.
B. The Statute
The law Congress enacted was called the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988
(“VPPA”).64 It states, “[a] video tape service provider who knowingly discloses, to
any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such
provider shall be liable to the aggrieved person . . . .”65 The statute also provides the
following definitions:
(1) the term “consumer” means any renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods
or services from a video tape service provider; . . .
(2) the term “personally identifiable information” includes information
which identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video
materials or services from a video tape service provider;
(3) the term “video tape service provider” means any person, engaged in the
business, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of rental, sale, or
delivery of prerecorded video cassette tapes or similar audio visual

58. Right to Financial Privacy of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3403 (2012) (restricting the disclosure of financial
records by financial institutions to governmental agencies).
59. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2001) (prohibiting the disclosure of
personally identifiable information together with “the extent of viewing or other use by the subscriber of
a cable service or other service provided by the cable operator.”).
60. Ann M. Schultz, Protecting Consumer Viewing Habits: Reflections on the Video Privacy
Protection Act, WAYNE ST. U., https://blogs.wayne.edu/informationpolicy/2013/11/30/protectingconsumer-viewing-habits-reflections-on-the-video-privacy-protection-act/ (last visited Feb 2, 2017).
61. Id.
62. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Personal but not Confidential: A New Debate Over Privacy, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 27, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/27/style/consumer-s-world-personal-but-notconfidential-a-new-debate-over-privacy.html.
63. See id.; see also Video and Library Privacy and Protection Act of 1988: Joint Hearing on H.R.
4947 and S. 2361 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm.
Of the Judiciary and S. Subcomm. on Tech. and the Law, of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong.
18 (1988).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012).
65. Id. at § 2710(b).
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materials, or any person or other entity to whom a disclosure is made . . . .66
The law goes on to permit the disclosure of such information in certain
circumstances: to the consumer; to anyone pursuant to the consumer’s written
consent; in the regular course of business; “to a law enforcement agency pursuant to
a warrant;” or “pursuant to a court order.”67
In addition to Congress’s primary concern (the public disclosure of video rental
histories), the testimonial record from the joint congressional hearing in 1987
expresses a separate concern: the collection and disclosure of this type of information
for the purpose of targeted marketing.68 Senior Vice President of the Direct
Marketing Association, Richard Barton, appeared at the hearing and was questioned
about that industry’s opposition to the bill. In reference to personal information
collected by private companies, he stated,
And there is no doubt that direct marketing companies use this
information in an attempt to increase sales. Companies in our industry want
to know about a person’s interest to be better able to market products to that
person. If you are a hiker, changes [sic] are you would be interested in a
catalogue selling camping or fly fishing equipment . . . . These lists are
closely controlled and they are used only for marketing purpose. They
cannot be accessed over the counter and are maintained with a high degree
of security.69
Reacting to Barton’s testimony, Senator Patrick Leahy shared his own
perception of direct marketing tactics:
Really, I have this vision of big brother, where somebody sits at a
massive computer—somebody whom I have never seen, never will meet in
my life—but that person can figure out that Patrick Leahy is this sort of
person based on what he reads or what he thinks or what he views and,
therefore, he gets pegged a certain way and we are now going to bring
whatever the marketing tools are available against him. Do you see my
concern?70
In response, Congress included a conciliatory provision in the VPPA that allows
names, addresses, and video tape subject matter to be released for the purposes of
targeted marketing, so long as the consumer has a reasonable opportunity to
decline.71
Interestingly, Congress amended the in 2012, but the only provision that was
altered was the requirement for video service providers to get written consent from
the consumer every single time the provider wanted to disclose PII.72 Netflix, a video

66. Id. at § 2710(a)(1)-(4).
67. Id. at § 2710(b)(2)(A)-(F).
68. Video and Library Privacy and Protection Act of 1988: Joint Hearing on H.R. 4947 and S. 2361
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice and S. Subcomm. on
Technology and the Law, 100th Cong. 115-118 (1988) (testimony of Richard A. Barton, Senior Vice
President, Direct Marketing Association).
69. Id. at 95.
70. Id. at 115-16.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(D) (2012).
72. Id.

262

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:2

streaming service provider,73 successfully lobbied Congress for an amendment that
would allow for a one-time electronic “opt-in” consent to be sufficient for disclosure
for up to two years. 74 Both the Senate and House Reports for the amendment, as
well as the Senate Subcommittee Hearing transcript, spent a majority of their time
discussing this particular provision, consequently leaving the more ambiguous
statutory definitions at issue in Yershov as is.
IV. YERSHOV V. GANNETT
The question before the Yershov court was whether the law laid out by Congress
in the VPPA applies to the newest iteration of video consumption. In 2013, Plaintiff
Alexander Yershov owned a smartphone, and onto that smartphone he downloaded
a free mobile application called the USA Today Mobile App (“the app”).75 He used
the app to access news, entertainment articles, and video clips.76 At the time Yershov
downloaded the app, he was never asked to consent to the disclosure of information
collected by the app to any third party.77
The USA Today Mobile App Yershov downloaded was owned by Defendant
Gannett Satellite Services, Inc. (“Gannett”), an international media company. 78 The
app was programmed to collect certain bits of data every time a user watched a video
on the app: “(1) the title of the video viewed, (2) the GPS coordinates of the device
at the time the video was viewed, and (3) certain identifiers associated with the user’s
device, such as its unique Android ID.”79 Gannett then sent this information to a
third party data analysis firm, Adobe.80
Yershov, as the named party in the class action suit, filed a claim against Gannett
in the Federal District Court of the District of Massachusetts under the Video Privacy
Protection Act of 1988.81 Yershov argued that Gannett, as a video service provider,
illegally disclosed to a third party information that identified him as having viewed
specific videos, in direct violation of the VPPA.82 Gannett moved to dismiss the suit
for failure to state a claim, asserting that Yershov did not adequately allege two
elements of the claim: (1) that the data provided to Adobe was “personally
identifiable information,” and (2) that Yershov was a “consumer.”83
The district court held that the information Gannett collected from Yershov and
73. For more information on Netflix, see NETFLIX, Netflix’s View: Internet TV is Replacing Linear
TV, https://ir.netflix.com/long-term-view.cfm (last visited April 14, 2017) (“Netflix is a global internet
TV network offering movies and TV series commercial-free, with unlimited viewing on any internetconnected screen for an affordable, no-commitment monthly fee.”).
74. The Video Privacy and Protection Act: Protecting Viewer Privacy in the 21st Century, Hearing
on H.R. 2471 Before S. Subcomm. on Privacy, Tech. and the Law, of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
Cong. 5 (2012); see also Natasha Singer, Put It on My Marquee: I Just Watched ‘Creepshow 2’, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/business/bill-would-let-video-consumersdisclose-all-their-choices.html.
75. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 135, 138 (D. Mass. 2015) rev’d,
820 F.3d 482, 485 (1st. Cir. 2016).
76. Id at 137.
77. Id at 138.
78. Id. at 137.
79. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 484.
80. Yershov, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 138.
81. Id. at 137.
82. Id at 140.
83. Id. at 142.
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later disclosed to Adobe “constitutes personally identifying information within the
meaning of the Video Privacy Protection Act.” 84 It reasoned that a unique device
identifier is the device’s “address” and, “[a] person’s smartphone ‘address’ is an
This
identifying piece of information, just like a residential address.” 85
determination rests largely on the court’s exceedingly broad interpretation of the
VPPA’s PII definition86 and diverges from nearly every other court holding on the
issue.87 The court rejected the reasoning of the District Court of New Jersey, which
held explicitly that an Android ID was not PII in the case In re Nickelodeon.88 The
Yershov court stated, “Nickelodeon’s conclusion that ‘PII is information which must,
without more, itself link an actual person to actual video materials’ is flawed. That
conclusion would seemingly preclude a finding that a home address or social security
number is PII.”89 The court only briefly mentioned the GPS location component,
[p]resumably, that information would be sufficient to identify a very
specific location (such as a building) from which the user viewed the video.
It therefore appears possible to identify, with a relatively high degree of
accuracy, the residential address of users . . . .90
The district court noted that “[i]t is also possible . . . that third parties such as
Adobe have access to databases that link Android IDs to specific persons.” 91
On Gannett’s second point, however, the district court agreed and held that
Yershov was not a “subscriber” 92 and therefore not a consumer under the VPPA’s
statutory definition.93 The court referenced several dictionary definitions and
analyzed other applications of the word “subscription” when used in the context of
online activity.94 It concluded that “where there is no payment of money, no
registration of information, no periodic delivery, and no privilege to view restricted
content, none of the necessary elements of a subscription are present.” 95 Having
found that Yershov was not a subscriber under those terms, and therefore not a
consumer, the court dismissed the claim.
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s ruling
to dismiss the claim.96 The First Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion

84. Id. at 146 (internal quotations omitted).
85. Id. at 141.
86. Notably, the court made no reference to the Act’s legislative history.
87. See, e.g., In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation, 827 F.3d 262, 290 (3d Cir. 2016)
(“[P]ersonally identifiable information under the Video Privacy Protection Act means the kind of
information that would readily permit an ordinary person to identify a specific individual's video-watching
behavior.”); Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 2014 WL 5023535, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2014) (“Without
more, an Android ID does not identify a specific person.”); In re Hulu Privacy Litigation, 2014 WL
1724344, at *12 (N.D. Ca. Apr. 28, 2014) (holding that a Hulu user ID—“without more”— is not
personally identifiable information).
88. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation, 827 F.3d 262, 295 (3d Cir. 2016).
1.
89.Yershov, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 145 (quoting In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation,
2014 WL 3012873, *10 (D.N.J. 2014)).
90. Id. at 142.
91. Id. at 146.
92. Id. at 149.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (2012).
94. Yershov, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 148.
95. Id. at 149.
96. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 490 (1st Cir. 2016).
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and reasoning regarding the claim’s PII element. Although quite brief in its opinion,
the court concluded that the statutory definition of PII is to be read broadly, and cited
the accompanying Senate Report as support for this interpretation: “the drafters’ aim
was ‘to establish a minimum, but not exclusive, definition of personally identifiable
information.’”97 The court only briefly referenced the GPS location data,
analogizing it to a home address, “[g]iven how easy it is to locate a GPS coordinate
on a street map, this disclosure would enable most people to identify what are likely
the home and work addresses of the viewer.” 98 Like the district court, the First
Circuit also noted the complaint’s allegation regarding Adobe’s databases, and the
possibility that Gannett knew that Adobe had the means to re-identify the Android
ID.99
The First Circuit departed from the district court decision with regard to the
statutory definition of “consumer.”100 The court concluded that Yershov was a
“subscriber,” despite not having made a monetary payment, not having completed a
registration of information, and not having received periodic delivery or any
privilege to view restricted content. The court reasoned that Yershov’s “access was
not free of a commitment to provide consideration in the form of that information
which was of value to Gannett.”101 The court also distinguished between the act of
reading news from the USA Today website, and doing the same on the app. The court
reasoned that the act of downloading the app was akin to the installation of a
“hotline” directly into Yershov’s home through which Yershov could watch videos
in exchange for providing his name and address. 102 In other words, the court felt that
downloading the app was a subscribing act.
The First Circuit was explicit in its conclusion that its decision is to be read
narrowly and that a claim under the VPPA is plausible when “Yershov used the
mobile device application that Gannett provided to him, which gave Gannett the GPS
location of Yershov’s mobile device at the time he viewed a video, his device
identifier, and the titles of the videos he viewed in return for access to Gannett’s
video content . . . .”103
At this time, the parties are preparing for trial in the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts.
V. ANALYSIS
To be sure, the First Circuit is not the only court that has struggled with
interpreting the VPPA. The Act has been described by other courts as “not well
drafted,”104 and “not entirely clear.”105 That the VPPA necessarily applies to a
continuously evolving subject matter—video technology—makes it especially
challenging to interpret thirty years after its enactment. Even the district court
analogized the circumstances in Yershov as “an attempt to place a square peg

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 486.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 489.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d 535, 538 (7th Cir. 2012).
In re Nickelodeon, 827 F.3d 262, 281 (3rd Cir. 2016).
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(modern electronic technology) into a round hole (a statute written in 1988).”106 The
Supreme Court has weighed in on interpreting statutes made ambiguous by
technology: “[w]hen technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous,
[a law] must be construed in light of [its] basic purpose.”107 This is perhaps easier
said than done.
A. Personally Identifiable Information Under the VPPA
The VPPA’s basic purpose is “[t]o preserve personal privacy with respect to the
rental, purchase or delivery of video tapes or similar audio visual materials.” 108
Fundamental to this purpose is the concept of personally identifiable information,
which despite being “one of the most central concepts in privacy regulation” remains
without a uniform definition.109 In fact, depending on where one looks—at statutes,
agency regulations and policy statements, industry self-regulation associations, or
privacy policies of individual companies—PII is defined in a myriad of different
ways.
For example, when Congress enacted the Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act (“COPPA”)110 in 1998, they defined PII by enumerating specific examples,
including a child’s name, address, email address, phone number, and social security
number. 111 They also included another provision that defined PII as “any other
identifier that the [Federal Trade] Commission determines permits the physical or
online contacting of a specific individual.” 112 This provision reflects Congress’s
intention to incorporate flexibility into the definition of PII by leaving the term to be
further defined by the FTC, which can—and has—expanded COPPA’s definition to
include new technology.113
Other entities take a different approach to defining PII. The Network
Advertising Initiative (“NAI”), a not-for-profit ad tech self-regulatory association,
defines PII as “any information used or intended to be used to identify a particular
individual, including name, address, telephone number, email address, financial
account number, and government-issued identifier.114 Thompson Reuters Westlaw’s
Privacy Statement, possibly the most explicit explanation of them all, marks PII as
your name, address, phone number, email address, payment card
information, and/or certain additional categories of information that
identify you personally; and . . . do[es] not include username, technical
106. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 135, 140 (D. Mass. 2015).
107. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
108. S. Rep. No. 100–599, at 1 (1988).
109. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 40, at 1816.
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2012).
111. § 6501(8).
112. Id.
113. FTC amended COPPA in 2013, adding GPS location, cookies, IP addresses, and unique device
identifiers to the definition of PII. 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2013); see also Natasha Singer, New Online Privacy
Rules for Children, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/technology/ftcbroadens-rules-for-online-privacy-of-children.html. Although the discussions leading up to the COPPA
amendment coincided with those of the VPPA amendment in 2012, Congress did not add to that statute’s
definition of PII. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3) (2012).
114. Understanding Online Advertising: Glossary, NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE, http://www.
networkadvertising.org/understanding-online-advertising/glossary (last visited Feb. 10, 2017) (emphasis
added).
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information (for example, Unique Device Identifier or “UDID,” Media
Access Control “MAC” address, Apple’s Identifier For Advertising or
“IFA,” and Internet Protocol or “IP” address), or numbers or alpha-numeric
identifiers assigned by us, third-parties, or your computer.115
The VPPA definition of PII, on the other hand, leaves much to be surmised. It
states rather circularly that “personally identifiable information includes information
which identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or
services from a video tape service provider.”116 In the words of the First Circuit, “the
definition . . . adds little clarity beyond training our focus on the question whether
the information identifies the person who obtained the video.”117 Or to quote another
author’s paraphrased version of the definition, “PII is PII.”118 The only additional
indication of what the Act’s drafters considered to be PII is found embedded in an
exception to the Act’s general prohibition: “A video tape service provider may
disclose personally identifiable information concerning any consumer to any person
if the disclosure is solely of the names and addresses of consumers . . . .”119 In other
words, names and addresses are without question PII under the VPPA.
All frustration aside, it is likely that the drafters of the VPPA intended the
definition of PII to be somewhat ambiguous in order to preserve the statute’s
flexibility over time. The VPPA’s accompanying Senate Report supports this theory:
“the word ‘includes’ . . . establish[es] a minimum, but not exclusive, definition of
personally identifiable information.”120 The district court deciding Yershov
interpreted the Senate Report to mean that “the universe of PII is greater than the
consumer’s name and address.”121 Other courts have made similar conclusions. 122
And this makes sense: email addresses and phone numbers, for example, were not
mentioned in the VPPA, but are characterized as PII by any modern definition.123
However, the Senate Report also incorporates a limiting principle. It explicitly
states, “personally identifiable information is intended to be transaction-oriented. It
is information that identifies a particular person as having engaged in a specific
transaction with a video tape service provider.”124 This is where both the district
court and the First Circuit went wrong: neither an Android ID nor a GPS location
sufficiently identifies a particular person under the conditions set forth by Congress
in the VPPA.
1. Android ID Is Not PII
An Android ID—or any similar pseudonymous number—does not identify a

115. Thompson Reuters Westlaw Privacy Statement, THOMPSON REUTERS WESTLAW, https://1.next.
westlaw.com/Privacy?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default) (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3) (2012).
117. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 486 (1st Cir. 2016).
118. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 40, at 1829.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(D) (emphasis added).
120. S. Rep. No. 100–599, at 12 (1988).
121. Yershov, 820 F. Supp. 3d at 140.
122. See, e.g., In re Hulu Privacy Litigation, 2014 WL 1724344, at *11, (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2014).
123. See Understanding Online Advertising: Glossary, NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, http://
www.networkadvertising.org/understanding-online-advertising/glossary (last visited Dec. 4, 2016).
124. S. REP. NO. 100–599, at 12 (1988) (emphasis added).
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particular person. It identifies a device.125 An Android ID is a number associated
with a particular device that,126 when used for advertising purposes, acts as a point
of connection in a spider web of informational data. 127 When Gannett sent an
Android ID and a video title to Adobe, it is likely that Adobe added the video title to
other information in their database that was also connected to that Android ID. For
example, the Android ID might already be associated with the user’s gender or age
range, or perhaps a notation that the user plays Angry Birds, or that she has an interest
in cats, or that she once searched for an Italian restaurant in Manhattan.128 Could
Adobe have linked the identifier to actually identifying information? Maybe. But,
to borrow the succinctly stated words of the First Circuit, “there is certainly a point
at which the linkage of information to identity becomes too uncertain, or too
dependent on too much yet-to-be-done, or unforeseeable detective work,” 129 and
contrary to the First Circuit’s actual holding, the circumstances in Yershov are
exactly that.
Furthermore, should the definition of PII be read so broadly to include a
pseudonymous number like an Android ID, video service providers are essentially
forced to read an extra provision into the Act. Not only would the VPPA prohibit
the “knowing[] disclos[ure], to any person, [of] personally identifiable information .
. . .”130 but also the knowing disclosure of non-PII to any person that may possess or
have access to information that could re-identify the non-PII.131 The District Court
for the Southern District of New York articulated the consequences of this argument
in Robinson v. Disney, “[i]f nearly any piece of information can, with enough effort
on behalf of the recipient, be combined with other information so as to identify a
person, then the scope of PII would be limitless.”132 As such, the broad interpretation
of PII embraced by the Yershov courts has been rejected by several courts before,
and, for the reasons enumerated above, I anticipate the First Circuit will be an outlier
on this issue for the foreseeable future.
2. GPS Location Is Not PII
Unlike the unique device identifier there was no caselaw on point prior to
Yershov that addressed whether GPS location data is PII. However, just like the
device identifier, GPS location does not identify a particular person. Rather, it
125. See, e.g., In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litigation, 827 F.3d 262, 290 (3d Cir. 2016)
(“[P]ersonally identifiable information under the Video Privacy Protection Act means the kind of
information that would readily permit an ordinary person to identify a specific individual's video-watching
behavior.”); Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 2014 WL 5023535, *12 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2014) (“Without
more, an Android ID does not identify a specific person.”); In re Hulu Privacy Litigation, 2014 WL
1724344 (holding that a Hulu user ID—“without more”— is not personally identifiable information).
126. Perhaps obvious but worth noting, a unique device identifier does not transfer when a user gets a
new device, therefore, the number is somewhat transitory depending on how often a device is replaced.
127. See Understanding Online Advertising: How Does It Work, NETWORK ADVERT. INITIATIVE,
http://www.networkadvertising.org/understanding-online-advertising/how-does-it-work, (last visited
Dec. 4, 2016).
128. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 28.
129. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 486 (1st Cir. 2016).
130. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (2012).
131. See also Kristian Stout, Pushing Ad Networks Out of Business: Yershov v. Gannett and the War
Against Online Platforms, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (May 10, 2016), https://truthonthemarket.com/2016
/05/10/pushing-ad-networks-out-of-business-yershov-v-gannett-and-the-war-against-online-platforms/.
132. Robinson v. Disney, 152 F. Supp. 3d 176, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
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identifies a location. The Yershov courts equated the GPS location data to a home
address.133 However, while every home address is a location, certainly not every
location is a home address. The GPS location would show wherever the video was
watched—and maybe it was watched at a house, but not necessarily a house that
identifies the particular viewer, which is what the statute requires.134 The user might
only watch videos away from home where he can find Wi-Fi access, if he is one of
the one-third of Americans without home broadband service. 135 A GPS location
might also identify a supermarket checkout line or a classroom at a law school, or
any other place where there are people watching video clips daily. Or it could
identify a building in Manhattan, but perhaps not the floor the video was watched
on, because a smartphone GPS may not be able to calculate elevation. 136 While it is
tempting to equate GPS location to a home address, it is simply too far a stretch and
requires too many assumptions to be considered PII.
Even taken together, the Android ID and GPS location require too many
additional steps and too many assumptions to be PII. The statute requires that
information “identify a person,” and that standard is simply not met with a video
viewed on an anonymous device in a location that cannot be assumed to be associated
in any identifiable way to the owner of the device—or the viewer of the video.
B. Yershov Is Not a Consumer
In order to trigger a VPPA violation, the disclosed PII must identify a
“consumer” of the video service provider. The Act defines a consumer as “a renter,
purchaser, or subscriber.”137 Yershov claims to be a “subscriber,” a term which is
neither statutorily defined nor elucidated in the legislative history. The First Circuit
came to two conclusions in its analysis of the word “subscriber”: (1) a monetary
payment is not a necessary element;138 and (2) subscription need only be “an
agreement to . . . be allowed access to electronic text or services.”139
First, the court pursued the “plain and ordinary meaning” of the word
“subscriber” by surveying dictionary definitions. 140 However, instead of relying on
“consensus dictionary definitions,”141 the First Circuit selected what appears to be
the only definition available that does not require monetary payment, signature, or
other additional affirmative action.142 The definition of “subscription” that the court

133. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Network, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 135, 142 (D. Mass. 2015) rev’d, 820
F.3d 482, 486 (1st Cir. 2016).
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3) (2012); S. REP. NO. 100–599, at 12 (1988).
135. John B. Horrigan & Maeve Duggan, Home Broadband 2015, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 21,
2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/12/21/home-broadband-2015/.
136. Craig Timberg, Cell Phone Tracking: Find an Address? Easy. But New Devices Can Calculate
Your Altitude, THE WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology
/cellphone-tracking-find-an-address-easy-but-new-devices-can-calculate-youraltitude/2014/11/19/a47a8
5b2-6a85-11e4-b053-65cea7903f2e_story.html?utm_term=.9234f83265a3.
137. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(1).
138. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 488 (1st Cir. 2016).
139. Id. at 487 (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1726 (4th ed. 2000)).
140. Id. at 487 (quoting In re Hill, 562 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 2009)).
141. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE
CONSTITUTION app. at 409 (2016) (collecting the Supreme Court’s canons of statutory interpretation).
142. See Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2015); Yershov v. Gannett
Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 135, 147 (D. Mass. 2015).
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favors reads, “[a]n agreement to receive or be given access to electronic texts or
services.”143 But even under this definition, to classify Yershov’s unilateral act of
downloading Gannett’s free app, with no other communication between the two
parties, cannot be called an “agreement.” The court goes on to describe the
interaction a different way, as Yershov having “provided Gannett with
consideration,” the consideration being Yershov’s information. 144 But this too is
misleading. To “provide” something to someone infers the element of knowledge or
intent,145 yet it would seem that Yershov was oblivious to Gannett’s collection of the
data. That Gannett took the data cannot be evidence of an agreement.
The court also seems to have overlooked the first step of the ordinary meaning
rule: “Follow the ordinary (also, ‘everyday’; or ‘commonsense’) meaning of the
statutory texts . . . . A statute has an ordinary meaning if you’d use its terminology
in normal conversation ‘without having other people look at you funny.’” 146 Most
people, either in 1988 or today, would not question what Congress meant by
“subscriber.” It is not a highly technical term like PII, but rather, in the context of
“renter, purchaser, or subscriber,”147 it is a word used in everyday speech to mean
one of two things: (1) “[a] person who makes a regular payment in return for
entitlement to receive a periodical, membership of a society, access to a
commercially provided service, etc.;”148 or (2) “[a] person who adds his or her details
to an electronic newsgroup, mailing list, etc., in order to receive, or contribute to, its
contents; a person who has signed up to receive messages or other information from
a newsgroup, mailing list, etc.”149 According to the complaint, Yershov neither paid
money, nor did he actually sign up to receive any information from Gannett. Thus,
the action cannot fall under the ordinary, everyday meaning of “subscriber.”
In sum, under no definition of “subscriber” does the relationship between
Yershov and Gannett fall. Even the definition embraced by the First Circuit fails,
without more, to evidence an “agreement” between Yershov and Gannett. Moreover,
the broad interpretation by the First Circuit creates a definition that is vastly overinclusive, and would almost certainly apply not only to viewers of videos via free
mobile app download, but to viewers of videos on websites as well, a consequence
that the First Circuit explicitly attempted to exclude from its decision. 150
C. The Implications of the 2012 Amendment to the VPPA
One additional argument in support of a narrower interpretation of the
definitions for both PII and subscriber is the fact that Congress amended the Act in
143. Yershov, 820 F.3d at 487 (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1726 (4th ed. 2000)).
144. Id. at 489.
145. See Provide, MERRIAM-WEBSTER THESAURUS, https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/
provide (last visited Dec. 4, 2016) (“to put (something) into the possession of another for use or
consumption;” synonyms include “deliver, feed, give . . . furnish supply.”).
146. ESKRIDGE, supra note 141, at 407.
147. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710(a)(1) (2012).
148. Subscriber, OED ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/192954?redirectedFrom=subscriber
(last visited Dec. 03, 2016).
149. Id.
150. Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 820 F.3d 482, 489 (1st Cir. 2016); see also
Kristian Stout, Pushing Ad Networks Out of Business: Yershov v. Gannett and the War Against Online
Platforms, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (May 10, 2016), https://truthonthemarket.com/2016/05/10/pushingad-networks-out-of-business-yershov-v-gannett-and-the-war-against-online-platforms/.
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2012 without updating either definition. 151 Included in the appendix of the Senate
Subcommittee Hearing transcript was a submission by the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (“EPIC”). EPIC urged the committee to: (1) reject the proposed
amendment regarding electronic opt-in consent; and (2) enact an amendment to the
definition of PII that would plainly include IP addresses and unique identifying
numbers.152 Unfortunately, the Senate Subcommittee did not explicitly address
EPIC’s second recommendation at the hearing, leaving the VPPA’s definition of PII
as ambiguous as it ever was.
However, an earlier House Report may suggest a narrower reading of the PII
definition. The Report explicitly states, “[t]his legislation does not change . . . the
definition of ‘personally identifiable information’ . . . .”153 It goes on to explain, “the
committee does not intend for this clarification to negate in any way existing laws,
regulations and practices designed to protect the privacy of children on the
Internet,”154 referring specifically to the broader, and more technologically current,
definition of PII in COPPA,
[COPPA] and its regulations apply to individually identifiable information
about a child that is collected online, such as full name, home address, email
address, telephone number or any other information that would allow
someone to contact the child. The Act and Rule also cover other types of
information—for example, hobbies, interests and information collected
through cookies or other types of tracking mechanisms—when they are tied
to individually identifiable information.155
The House Report seems to mark the clear differences between the definitions
of PII in the VPPA and in COPPA. Essentially, the House Report acknowledges that
while the VPPA amendment will not broaden the definition of PII to include all that
is covered by COPPA, the narrower definition of PII in the VPPA does not negate
COPPA’s definition when regulating videos watched by children.
Some might argue that because Congress had the opportunity to expand the
VPPA’s definitions of PII and subscriber but chose not to, that this is an indication
that Congress intended the definitions of both terms to be construed narrowly. 156
However, a better argument for the narrow interpretation of each term is that the
VPPA is, by most opinions, an antiquated statute and to stretch the scope of the
statute to encompass the facts of this situation, and others like it, is a misapplication
of the law.

151. Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258 § 2, 126 Stat. 2414
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710(2)(B) (2012)).
152. Id. at 59-60.
153. H.R. REP. NO. 112-312, at 3 (2011).
154. Id.
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. It is generally understood that Congress’s inaction is not firm ground on which to base an
argument for a particular interpretation of a statute. See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287
(2002) (“We have elsewhere held, however, that failed legislative proposals are ‘a particularly dangerous
ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute,’ reasoning that ‘[c]ongressional inaction lacks
persuasive significance because several equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction . . .
.’”) (citations omitted).
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VI. CONCLUSION: TRANSPARENCY AND CONSUMER CHOICE
In recent years, both the House of Representatives and the Senate have
introduced sweeping legislation aimed at the collection, maintenance, security, and
disclosure of consumer data, especially that by third-party data collectors.157 In 2015
alone, five bills legislating commercial use and storage of data—which would
delegate rulemaking authority to the FTC—were introduced in Congress.158 None
of these bills have been enacted, perhaps due to significant lobbying efforts in
opposition to such regulation.159
While the FTC itself has advocated for more government regulation of consumer
data collection,160 it has also made statements in support of the ad tech community’s
effort to self-regulate.161 It has repeatedly applauded the efforts of self-regulatory
associations,162 and continues to work with these associations to advance best
practices in the industry as technology evolves. 163 This is largely because selfregulation is flexible in a way that federal and state legislation and regulation is not.
Advertising technology is a constantly evolving landscape; which means the ability
for self-regulation to respond quickly—and even stay ahead of—changes in the

157. In addition to the legislative action of recent years, the Obama Administration had paid significant
attention to the collection of consumer data, and advocated for more regulation. See, e.g., THE WHITE
HOUSE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A
FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL
ECONOMY (2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf; see also
Natasha Singer, White House Proposes Broad Consumer Privacy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/28/business/white-house-proposes-broad-consumer-data-privacy-bill
.html?_r=0. It remains unclear how the Trump Administration views the practices of the ad tech industry,
although it appears President Trump tends to lean toward less regulation of industry in general. Perhaps
the best clue in support of this view thus far is the roll back by Congress and President Trump of an FCC
rule approved in October 2016 that required ISPs to get consumer consent before collecting a user’s online
activity data. See Steve Lohr, Trump Completes Repeal of Online Privacy Protections From Obama Era,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/technology/trump-repeal-onlineprivacy-protections.html?_r=0.
158. Data Security Act of 2015, H.R. 2205, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Security Act of 2015, S.961,
114th Cong. (2015); Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015, H.R.1770 (114th Cong. (2015);
Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015, S.177, 114th Cong. (2015); and Secure and Protect
Americans’ Data Act, H.R. 4187 (114th Cong. (2015).
159. See, e.g., Kate Kaye, Big Data Goes to Washington—And Spends Lots of Money, AD AGE (March
11, 2013), http://adage.com/article/dataworks/big-data-washington-spends-lots-money/240232/.
160. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
(2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-calltransparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.
161. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ISSUES REPORT ON ONLINE PROFILING
(July 27, 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2000/07/federal-trade-commissionissues-report-online-profiling (“The Commission unanimously applauded the Network Advertising
Initiative (NAI) for developing an innovative self-regulatory proposal which addresses the privacy
concerns consumers have about online profiling.”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, CROSS-DEVICE TRACKING
(2017), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/cross-device-tracking-federal-trade-commission-staff-report-january
-2017 (“FTC staff commends these self-regulatory efforts to improve transparency and choice in the crossdevice tracking space.”).
162. See id.
163. See Jessica Rich, Keeping Up with Online Advertising, FED. TRADE COMM’N: BUSINESS BLOG
(Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2016/04/keeping-onlineadvertising-industry.
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market is a critical benefit.164 Moreover, businesses that align themselves with selfregulatory associations indicate to consumers an organizational character for
trustworthiness. Research has shown that consumers are concerned with the
commercial collection of data,165 and will share data more willingly with trustworthy
companies.166 Therefore, in a Darwinian fashion, the companies that maintain data
trustworthiness will flourish, and those who do not will wither.
To build consumer trust, both the FTC and self-regulatory associations agree
that companies must embrace data collection transparency.167 Transparency is threefold: first, companies—including both first- and third-party data collectors—should
develop and present simple and clear data collection and security policies to
consumers. Second, companies should educate consumers about what data they
collect, and how it is used and secured. Third, companies should create pathways
for consumers to access the data that is collected, and create procedures to correct
any inaccuracies.168
A related principle to transparency generally encouraged by both the FTC and
self-regulatory associations is consumer choice. Developing company policies and
programs that allow consumers to choose which data they share and to whom it is
disclosed is an important policy with which consumer advocates and the ad tech
sector are still grappling.169
It can be said that the self-regulation model is a healthy compromise between
pure market control and rigid government regulation. In this sense, with regard to
the VPPA and the evolution of video data and advertising technology, consumers
would be best-served outside of the court system. Instead, such concerns are better
addressed by self-regulatory policies and enforcement procedures. The fact is, more
and more mobile technology consumers are becoming educated about data collection
and dissemination, and mobile companies will be forced to comply with the
recommendations of such self-regulatory associations, or be abandoned by their
customers. And while information privacy in the world of the mobile internet will
likely remain a slippery issue, a combination of consumer education and market
forces may be the key to achieving a satisfactory balance between consumer privacy
and the mobile internet as we know it.

164. See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the BBB SelfRegulation Conference: Strategies to Bring to the Mobile and Global Era (June 24, 2014); Siona Listokin,
Industry Self-Regulation of Consumer Data Privacy and Security, 32 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. &
PRIVACY L. 15, 16 (2015).
165. Morey, Forbath & Schoop, supra note 44.
166. Id.
167. Id.; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS, at 60 (2012); Who We Are:
History, NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, http://www.networkadvertising.org/about-nai/history (last
visited Feb. 17, 2017); Listokin, supra note 164, at 20.
168. E.g. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 167, at 60.
169. Id. at 35.

